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BOOK REVIEW OF
ALAN BOYLE AND CHRISTINE CHINKIN,THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007)
by Sean D. MurphyGeorge Washington University Law School(the final version of this book review appears in the October 2010 issue of the AmericanJournal of international Law)
One of the abiding mysteries about the teaching of public international law is the peculiardisconnect between the extensive focus on four classic “sources” of international law, as typicallytaught in law schools or recounted in treatises, and the way in which contemporary international lawis actually made. The prime example of that disconnect is probably customary international law.While most textbooks and treatises spend considerable time explicating the requirements foruniform, consistent, and long-standing State practice, combined with opinio juris, as illustratedthrough key decisions of the World Court from years past (such as the S.S. Lotus case or North SeaContinental Shelf cases), and perhaps with some attention to the great controversies about the source(such as whether “words” can suffice instead of “action”), it is actually rather difficult to identify anew norm of international law that has emerged purely as a matter of widespread State practice.Indeed, although theory would call for a detailed search of the practice and beliefs of States spanningdecades, if not centuries, rarely do international or national courts today engage in any such inquiry,and rarer still do States as a predicate to their diplomatic exchanges.
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Conversely, an extraordinary range of international “rules” or “norms” are created todaythrough mechanisms that do not fit easily into the traditional sources of international law. Non-binding “recommendations” of the World Health Organization, developed by respected experts inthe field, have a treaty-like effect in prompting national health administrations to adopt laws andregulations that implement the recommendations. Resolutions of the UN Security Council impose“legislative-like” obligations upon States in an effort to prevent the financing of terroristorganizations or to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction. Trade obligations arisingunder the Uruguay Round agreements may be avoided if national laws seek to uphold “standards”established by entities such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission or the Commission onPhytosanitary Measures. Committees or commissions formed under multilateral human rightstreaties assert a power to interpret and at times expand the meaning of such conventions, as well asto judge the permissibility of reservations made by State parties. Transnational corporations, eagerto avoid adverse publicity, boycotts, and even litigation, adopt and implement non-binding “codesof conduct” (generated by States, international organizations, or non-governmental organizations),which in some instances non-governmental organizations provide mechanisms for independentcertification of compliance. One or a few non-binding resolutions universally agreed to by States thatpurport to recognize a legal norm are used as evidence of customary international law. 
The nature of such “norms” as “law” is, of course, debated, and some adhere to a notion thatultimately many of these norms can be traced back to some form of consent by a State to a treatyobligation. Yet, in light of such developments, the standard account of the four “sources” of
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international law seems woefully incomplete, and must give way to a much richer explanation ofhow international legal norms can and do emerge. 
Thankfully, many notable efforts have been undertaken over the past decade to study suchlaw-making, such as Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein’s path-breaking article in the pages of thisJournal on law-making by autonomous institutional arrangements in multilateral agreements,1Dinah Shelton’s edited collection analyzing the effects of non-binding international norms,2 Anne-Marie Slaughter’s account of law-making by networks of governmental experts operating acrossborders,3 Anthony Anghie’s exploration of the enduring influence of colonial and Euro-centricattitudes in shaping international law,4 José Alvarez’s thorough treatise on law-making byinternational organizations,5 or the on-going research project at New York University School of Lawon “global administrative law”,6 to name just a few. 
In The Making of International Law, Professors Alan Boyle of the University of Edinburgh
4and Christine Chinkin of the London School of Economics add to this literature, but set their sightson providing a broad account of contemporary law-making, looking across different areas oforganizational behavior, both governmental and non-governmental. They eschew a doctrinaldiscussion of the four classic sources of international law, providing instead “a study of the principalmultilateral processes and law-making tools through which contemporary international law is made”(p. vii). To that end, Chapter 1 addresses certain general aspects of international law-making,including a survey of theories of international law, problems of legitimacy in new law-makingtechniques, and calls for general reform. Chapter 2 addresses the “who” of international law-making(i.e., the participants), Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the “how” of such law-making (i.e., multilateral law-making through diplomatic processes or codificiation/development through expert bodies), andChapter 5 recounts “what” is produced by such law-making (i.e., the types of law-makinginstruments). Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the role of international courts and tribunals as law-makers, making the case that international judges do not only apply law as they find it, but fill ingaps and in some instances extend or create new norms.
Two particular short-comings of this volume should first be noted before moving onto itsattractive elements. First, although the title might suggest otherwise, the book does not provide asystematic account of the “making” of international law. There is no discussion of the making ofinternational law through bilateral treaties or other instruments, little discussion of the making ofinternational law by multilateral treaties in the sense of creating binding obligations directly uponthe parties to the treaty, and virtually no discussion of law-making in the form of classic customaryinternational law. At the beginning of the volume, the authors suggest that such traditional sources
5of international law have been recounted elsewhere and hence need not be addressed again (p. 2),but as one moves through the volume it becomes clearer that the authors conception of the “making”of international law entails law that is “made” through mechanisms other than the classic sourcesof international law. Thus, the authors assert that “[w]e can only begin to talk seriously aboutinternational law-making processes, ... if we identify some other sense in which the instruments[States] adopt become ‘law’ beyond the specific context of participation in a treaty or the affirmationof a soft law instrument” (p. 161).  In other words, when States conclude a multilateral treaty thatdirectly binds them, they have not engaged in a process that “makes” law or at least not law thatneeds to be seriously discussed. 
Yet such an account of the “making” of international law is just as incomplete and unhelpfulas an account that sees international law-making as arising solely from the classic sources ofinternational law. Both classic and more contemporary forms of international law-making exist anddeserve serious study. A volume focusing solely on more contemporary forms of international law-making is certainly appropriate, but it need not characterize traditional means as something otherthan “law-making”. At a minimum, the authors might have explained and defended their concept of“law-making”, so as to clarify their choice of processes and to avoid confusion  for those not alreadyversed in the traditional sources of international law.
Second, even with respect to more contemporary forms of law-making, the book does notseek “to provide a comprehensive account of the myriad ways in which contemporary internationallaw is made” (p. 2). One cannot fault the authors for avoiding the difficulty of trying to provide a
6definitive account, in a single volume, of the whole range of contemporary forms of law-making, andinstead reaching for selected “examples” and “case studies” so as “to provide a flavour of thediversity of international law-making processes” (p. 2). Yet even within this more scaled-back,sampler approach, several parts of the volume seem oddly skewed in their content. 
For example, Chapter 2 of the book is on “Participants in International Law-Making”.  Thechapter begins by noting that a “focus solely on state actions gives a misleading picture ofinternational law-making” (p. 41). After that sensible observation, virtually the entire rest of thechapter—about one fifth of the book—is about non-governmental organizations, covering topicssuch as “NGOs and the UN”, “NGOs and Treaty-Making”, “NGOs and International Law-Making,”NGOs Monitoring and Norm Generation,” and so on. Among other things, the authors note that thenumber of NGOs  represented at the Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court “waslarger than the number of participating states (160) and larger than any single state delegation” (p.73). Given this extensive emphasis on NGOs in a chapter addressing “participants”, one mightnaturally emerge a belief that the most important “participant” in contemporary international law-making are NGOs, yet that belief would be just as misleading as one that regards States alone as therelevant actor. States continue to play a dominant role in the formation of contemporary internationallaw, as do international organizations, with NGO’s as an important but secondary participant.Another example of a distorted focus might be the lack of sufficient attention to national law as ameans for international law-making (a brief discussion appears at pp. 85-87). National law plays anextraordinary role in international law-making, both in terms of reducing inchoate internationalnorms to detailed and binding national laws and regulations, and in terms of generating new
7international norms and principles through national legislation or case law that emerges across theglobe. 
Despite its flaws, the book is well worth reading. Boyle and Chinkin are extraordinarilygifted international lawyers, highly conversant in the mechanisms by which international lawoperates, especially in fields where their expertise is sharpest, such as the law of the sea and humanrights. In a very well-written, coherently organized, and relatively brief text (300 pages), they covera wide array of important issues, including  how the international law-making agenda gets set, theimportance of “legitimacy” for law-making processes, the vexing role of “soft law” in conditioninginter-State behavior, and the role of international courts in not just stating the law, but creating it aswell. Perhaps curiously, given their emphasis on contemporary law-making, Boyle and Chinkinspend a considerable amount of time discussing two “old school” entities, the International LawCommission (ILC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but both discussions are informativeand rich in insights. Further, throughout the volume, the authors provide copious citations tocontemporary cases and scholarship, along with a helpful list of further readings at the end of eachchapter.
One of the strengths of the volume is that the authors are careful to avoid facile opinions. Forexample, though they clearly recognize the significance of NGO participation in international law-making, they cautiously conclude that “it seems premature to assert that there is a right to access andparticipation” for NGOs in that law-making (p. 57). Moreover, they worry about the disconnectbetween contemporary law-making and the traditional reliance on State-based consent, noting that
8“[p]articularly in areas such as human rights or environmental law there is a tendency to assert newnorms of customary law at will in order to advance political and social agendas—an activity pursuedespecially by NGOs.” When that happens, “[s]cant regard is given to the niceties of state consent orthe likelihood of compliance with such easily pronounced norms” (p. 285). Another strength of thebook are Boyle and Chinkin’s identification of strengths and weaknesses in contemporaryinternational law-making, and their suggestions for improvement. For example, while some havedecried the relatively small number of international lawyers who repeatedly appear before the ICJand other global tribunals, Boyle and Chinkin applaud this development, since this “epistemiccommunity of the comparatively small body of lawyers ... ensures a common set of perspectivesabout the appropriate way to present an international case and has a tangible impact upon the wayinternational courts function, and thus on their law-making potential” (p. 291). Looking to the future,they suggest that the ILC could play a larger role in international law-making processes by activelyproposing cooperation with UN organs and international organizations so as to find useful proposalsfor future ILC work, rather than relying just on ILC-initiated ideas (p. 177).
Both authors are U.K. nationals and they occasionally express views about the role of theUnited States in the making of international law. Particularly for the many U.S. nationals who arereaders of this Journal, the following proposition will be of interest: “The perception that the US canand should operate more effectively outside many of the constraints of international law poses thegreatest contemporary challenge to the post-1945 system of multilateral law-making exercisedprincipally through the United Nations” (p. 104). Presumably the entity doing the “perceiving” is theU.S. Government, or perhaps the people of the United States, and it is interesting that the authors
9are not asserting that the challenge arises from an actual ability of the United States to operateoutside the constraints of international law but, rather, the United States’ perception that such anability exists. More discussion as to why this factor is the “greatest” contemporary challenge wasprobably warranted, given the existence of other contenders, such as the inability or unwillingnessof many States actually to implement the treaties that they ratify, the enduring difficulty forinternational courts and tribunals in securing wide-ranging jurisdiction to which States adhere (thedifficulty of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in developing a significant caseload or the paucityof prosecutions at the International Criminal Court come to mind), or the intractable economicdisparities between blocs of States that often polarize and politicize the law-making processes.Indeed, as the authors themselves note, sometimes it is the “unilateral” action by the United Statesthat results in international law-making, such as the adoption of IMO regulations phasing out singlehull oil tankers (p. 133) or the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round (p. 136).
All-in-all, for those interested in an engaging and informed survey of various ways in whichinternational law is currently made, this book makes an excellent starting point, and points thedirection for those who wish to embark on even deeper inquiries.
SEAN D. MURPHYGeorge Washington University Law School
